Supplemental Online Appendix

Communicating the Rift: Voter Perceptions of Intra-Party Dissent in Parliaments

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1 Experimental design appendix

1.1 Human subject recruitment and consent

The research was approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Cologne and the University of Essex. Respondents were recruited through the commercial survey firm YouGov. YouGov compensates their participation through a reward scheme that allocates points redeemable for cash or with retailers. Compensation is said to adhere to local standards of fair pay (e.g. above local minimum wage regulations). Upon entering the YouGov pool of respondents, detailed information is given about the purpose and scope of studies in which respondents may be invited to participate as well as the rights of respondents.

After being invited by YouGov to participate in the online survey presented here, respondents were shown an initial consent screen informing them that the survey is part of an academic research study. The consent form used language approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Cologne and following standard practices in online survey research. Additionally, the consent screen gave respondents information about how the data would be used and stored, as well as how the anonymity of responses is ensured. Respondents were asked to provide voluntary consent to continue with the study and they were given information on how to contact the investigators should they have any questions. Respondents who did not consent, did not continue with the study. The study did not involve any deception, nor did it intervene in political processes.

During the survey and experiment, YouGov stores observations for the defined variables on each subject on secure server space made accessible after the conclusion of the survey only to the authors. After the experiment is conducted, the data of respondents' decisions, already excluding any identifying information, is transferred to the authors' computers. Since no connection is established to the recorded data, confidentiality of the individual respondent is guaranteed. Even though data is provided on the respondent-level, no identifying information is provided; respondents are assigned a random number to keep track of the data produced in the survey and survey experiment.

1.2 Experimental protocol and manipulation checks

Table A.1: Wording of the presented bills

Policy area	Policy preferences
Social spending and taxes	Increase social spending by increasing taxes.
	Decrease social spending in order to cut taxes.
Competences of the European Union	Increase the number of areas in which the European Union can make policy.
	Decrease the number of areas in which the European Union can make policy.
European Union integration	Strengthen [country]'s ties to the European Union.
	Weaken [country]'s ties to the European Union.
Climate change	Establish new environmental regulations, imposing costs on businesses, but helping the fight against climate change.
	Remove existing environmental regulations, helping businesses generate economic growth, but hindering the fight against climate change.
Immigration	Make it easier for foreigners to immigrate to [country].
	Make it harder for foreigners to immigrate to [country].

Figure A.1: Marginal means of outcome variables approval of MP (blue, lighter marker) and approval of leadership (black, darker marker) by whether the leadership welcomed or criticizes the rebellion, the rebel MP's explanation for his/her rebellion, and by whether MP and voter share policy positions. Marginal means are shown for each vignette separately (thus the plot shows several dots of the same color for each attribute and outcome variable).



A glance at Figure A.1 indicates no significant deviation of marginal means across the five vignettes. For a more systematic robustness check, we test for a vignette order effect by running the regression of outcome measure approval of MP and approval of leadership on the main comparisons attributes that are listed as tests of each of our hypotheses, all remaining fully factorized attributes, country fixed effects, and add an interaction of the main comparison attributes with vignette order. The regressions are run separately on the four subsets of the data shown in the figures in the main text (Rebel MP and voter differ in policy position vs share a policy position and leadership criticised vs leadership welcomed rebellion).

A test whether the interactions between vignette order and main comparisons attributes are jointly zero in each regression, allows us to demonstrate that there is no effect of vignette order on our main results. We cannot reject the null that the interactions are jointly zero when testing Hypothesis 1a for when voter and rebel MP differ in policy position and the Leadership welcomes the rebellion and when testing Hypothesis 1d when voter and rebel MP share policy positions; also when testing Hypothesis 2 when rebel MP and voter share policy positions.

In all four instances, however, when we restrict our analysis to the first vignette only (because the decision there cannot be affected by decisions in later of the five vignettes shown to respondents), we find that our results hold. In particular, with respect to Hypothesis 1a, the difference in marginal mean of approval of the MP when the rebel gave the reason "Bill bad

for society, benefitting only few", it is still only significantly outperformed by "Voters were against bill" (marginal mean 4.79 vs 4.97) but yields significantly higher marginal means than "Bill does not go far enough" and "Badly drafted bill". Further, with respect to Hypothesis 1d the difference in marginal mean of approval of the MP when the rebel gave the reason "Bill does not go far enough " vs any other explanations also holds in direction and significance. The explanation always fares worst with the lowest marginal mean of 3.72 when the leadership criticized and 3.77 when the leadership welcomed rebellion. Finally, with respect to hypothesis 2, when rebel MP and voter share policy positions, the leadership still finds more approval when it welcomes the rebel's action than when it criticises it (4.29 vs 3.89 with $p < .01$).

2 Statistical appendix

2.1 Summary statistics

Figure B.2: Distribution of outcome variables approval of MP and approval of leadership by country.



2.2 Additional analyses

Table B.2: Regression of outcome measure approval of MP on whether rebel MP and voter share policy positions, vignette order, and country fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level.

MP and voter share policy position	0.498^{***}
	(0.015)
Vignette number	-0.030^{***}
	(0.004)
Germany	0.044
	(0.028)
Italy	0.040
	(0.029)
United Kingdom	−0.014
	(0.027)
Constant	4.119^{***}
	(0.024)
R^2	0.022
Adj. R^2	0.022
Num. obs.	70000
RMSE	1.695
N Clusters	14000

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure B.3: Marginal means of outcome variables approval of MP and approval of leadership by leadership response and rebel MP reasoning attribute by country when MP and voter **share** policy positions.



Figure B.4: Marginal means of outcome variables approval of MP and approval of leadership by leadership response and rebel MP reasoning attribute by country when MP and voter **differ** in policy positions.



Figure B.5: Marginal means of outcome variables approval of MP and approval of leadership for context attributes (not rebel MP explanation attributes or leadership response) by whether MP and respondent share policy positions and a median split of whether the respondent deemed the issue shown in the vignette as individually salient.



Should respondents infer partisanship from another attribute, we would introduce heterogeneity in our estimates of the relationship between explanations of rebel MP and party leadership behavior and approval. The most obvious tool for inferring partisanship may be whether the party shares the voters' policy position; if it does, the voter may believe that party presented on the vignette is most likely to be the party s/he supports the most. A simple test of whether we introduce heterogeneity in our estimates by allowing respondents to infer partisanship, is then to show our main analysis of rebel explanations by respondents' self-reported party choice for those vignettes where respondent and rebel party share policy positions. If we find variation across parties, our results are not robust to what respondents infer from the information given in the vignettes. Referencing the left panel of Figure 1, we found that MP approval was highest when the rebel explained her behavior with "Voters were against the bill" and lowest when explained with "Against personal convictions". We find that this conclusion does not need to be revised for any subset of supporters of any of the two parties in each country for which we have the largest and second-largest number of observations in our sample; the smaller number of observations on supporters of any other party does not allow for a reliable subset analysis. The overall result that the party leadership benefits from welcoming rebellion also holds for all of the two parties in each country for which we have the most observations except for respondents who support Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy where the difference in marginal means between a leadership that welcomed vs a leadership that criticizes is positive still but not significantly so.

Figure B.6: Marginal means of outcome variables approval of MP (blue, lighter marker) and approval of leadership (black, darker marker) by whether the leadership welcomed or criticizes the rebellion, the rebel MP's explanation for his/her rebellion, respondents' self-reported partisanship for when MP and voter share policy positions.



Figure B.7: Marginal means of approval of MP by whether the leadership welcomed or criticized the rebel MP's actions and rebel MP reasoning attribute, whether MP and respondent share policy positions, and country.



Figure B.8: Marginal means of approval of leadership by whether the leadership welcomed or criticized the rebel MP's actions and rebel MP reasoning attribute, whether MP and respondent share policy positions, and country.



Table B.3: Regression of outcome measure approval of MP on all, fully factorized attributes, vignette order, and country fixed effects and the interaction of those variables with the attributes shared position and leadership (standard errors clustered at the respondent-level). For ease of display, we show the regression run separately by levels of attributes shared position and leadership and omit the bill direction attribute.

	MP and voter differ in policy position		MP and voter share policy position	
	Leadership criticized	Leadership welcomed	Leadership criticized	Leadership welcomed
Voters were against bill (Baseline)				
Against personal convictions	−0.491***	−0.528***	−0.132***	−0.057
	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.053)
Experts are against bill	−0.397***	−0.386***	−0.316***	−0.345***
	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.054)
Bill does not go far enough	−0.323***	−0.312***	−1.098***	−1.059***
	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.054)
Bill bad for society, benefitting only few	−0.318***	−0.357***	−0.097*	−0.110*
	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.051)
Badly drafted bill	−0.284***	−0.262***	−0.283***	−0.165**
	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.051)
Third term	−0.016	−0.009	0.027	−0.016
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Opposition	0.047*	0.021	−0.028	−0.035
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Male MP	−0.012	0.039	−0.027	−0.058
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Only rebel	−0.010	−0.030	0.037	0.056
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Pivotal	−0.097***	−0.061*	−0.008	−0.005
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Public supports	−0.289***	−0.311***	−0.126***	−0.103***
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Immigration	−0.250***	−0.255***	0.218***	0.049
	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.067)
Regulations	−0.241***	−0.049	−0.002	0.065
	(0.040)	(0.084)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Spending and taxes	−0.136**	−0.153*	0.255***	−0.005
	(0.051)	(0.073)	(0.057)	(0.064)
Ties to EU	−0.121**	−0.186**	0.129*	0.076
	(0.041)	(0.072)	(0.057)	(0.064)
Vignette number	−0.025***	−0.046***	−0.022**	−0.037***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Germany	−0.033	−0.038	0.111**	0.137**
	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.052)
Italy	0.027	0.048	0.040	0.062
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.051)
United Kingdom	−0.219***	−0.089	0.114**	0.152**
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.050)
Constant	4.779***	4.915***	4.790***	4.944***
	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.084)
R^2	0.022	0.024	0.049	0.050
Adj. R^2	0.021	0.022	0.048	0.048
Num. obs.	23177	11731	23258	11834
RMSE	1.669	1.652	1.671	1.661
N Clusters	12169	8461	12167	8504

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B.4: Regression of outcome measure approval of party leadership on all, fully factorized attributes, vignette order, and country fixed effects and the interaction of those variables with the attributes shared position and leadership (standard errors clustered at the respondent-level). For ease of display, we show the regression run separately by levels of attributes shared position and leadership and omit the bill direction attribute.

	MP and voter differ in policy position		MP and voter share policy position	
	Leadership criticized	Leadership welcomed	Leadership criticized	Leadership welcomed
Voters were against bill (Baseline)				
Against personal convictions	0.115**	−0.271***	0.051	−0.117*
	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.053)
Experts are against bill	0.104**	−0.237***	0.010	−0.278***
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.054)
Bill does not go far enough	0.156***	−0.223***	0.169***	−0.628***
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.053)
Bill bad for society, benefitting only few	0.092**	−0.251***	−0.016	−0.121*
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.051)
Badly drafted bill	0.104**	−0.184***	0.042	−0.269***
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.052)
Third term	0.013	−0.025	0.017	−0.001
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.031)
Opposition	−0.006	0.000	0.012	0.024
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Male MP	−0.015	0.022	−0.009	−0.009
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Only rebel	−0.019	0.016	−0.006	−0.024
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Pivotal	−0.015	−0.091**	0.076***	0.035
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Public supports	0.149***	−0.122***	0.099***	−0.010
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Immigration	0.199***	0.031	−0.168**	−0.169*
	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.066)
Regulations	0.215***	−0.021	−0.004	−0.165**
	(0.037)	(0.079)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Spending and taxes	0.158***	0.013	−0.194***	−0.174**
	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.064)
Ties to EU	0.110**	−0.106	−0.144**	0.046
	(0.039)	(0.070)	(0.054)	(0.063)
Vignette number	0.030***	−0.019	0.021**	−0.002
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Germany	0.010	−0.019	−0.156***	0.037
	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.051)
Italy	0.322***	0.085	0.296***	0.200***
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.050)
United Kingdom	0.115**	0.078	−0.147***	0.103*
	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.049)
Constant	3.529***	4.619***	3.487***	4.579***
	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.082)
R^2	0.013	0.008	0.019	0.019
Adj. R^2	0.012	0.006	0.018	0.017
Num. obs.	23177	11731	23258	11834
RMSE	1.554	1.583	1.591	1.649
N Clusters	12169	8461	12167	8504

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$